摘要 :
This paper applies insights from the economic literature to evaluate costs and benefits of the policy decision recently taken by the Dutch government to introduce ownership separation between energy distribution on the one hand, a...
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This paper applies insights from the economic literature to evaluate costs and benefits of the policy decision recently taken by the Dutch government to introduce ownership separation between energy distribution on the one hand, and production and retail on the other. The major benefit of this measure is that it enables the privatisation of commercial activities if the infrastructure has to remain in public hands. This benefit can, however, also be realised by more efficient ways, such as improving the corporate governance structure. The other benefits arise from improved network performance, efficiency of regulatory activity and increased competition. The realisation of these results is, of course, not a free lunch. Ownership unbundling reduces economies of scope, creates one-off transaction costs, and may also affect investments in generation by the currently vertically integrated Dutch utility holdings. We conclude that mainly because of the uncertainty about the future role of small-scale generation and the uncertainty about the magnitude of the one-off transaction costs related to the cross-border leases, the net effect on welfare of ownership unbundling is ambiguous.
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摘要 :
We study competition for high bandwidth services in the telecommunications industry by introducing the possibility of unbundling the local loop, where leased lines permit the entrant to provide services without building up its own...
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We study competition for high bandwidth services in the telecommunications industry by introducing the possibility of unbundling the local loop, where leased lines permit the entrant to provide services without building up its own infrastructure. We use a dynamic model of technology adoption and study the incentives of the entrant to lease loops and compete "service-based", and/or to build up a new and more efficient infrastructure and compete "facility-based", given the rental price. We show that the incumbent sets too low a rental piice for its loops; hence, the entrant adopts the new technology too late from a social welfare perspective. The distortion may appear not only on the timing of technology adoption but also on the type (quality) of thenew technology to be adopted. We also show that while regulating the rental price may suffice to achieve socially desirable outcomes, a sunset clause does not improve social welfare.
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摘要 :
Further unbundling measures are currently implemented in the European energy markets. One option is the "deep independent system operator" (deep-ISO). An ISO splits the system operator from transmission ownership, which can remain...
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Further unbundling measures are currently implemented in the European energy markets. One option is the "deep independent system operator" (deep-ISO). An ISO splits the system operator from transmission ownership, which can remain integrated with generation assets, if so desired. This construction avoids violation of constitutional law, but does not address the "strategic-investment-withholding" argument. Therefore, a deep-ISO receives the competence for transmission investment decision making and can if necessary order a transmission owner to make the investment. This construction creates an uneasy governance split between decision-maker and risk-bearer. In this paper, we discuss the scope of the deep-ISO and the role of third parties in decentralised transmission investment, in particular "tendered transmission investment", to address the above mentioned governance problem.
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摘要 :
This article provides a framework for analyzing the effects of imperfect ownership unbundling and the effectiveness of related corporate governance mechanisms as well as regulatory actions to mitigate against such effects in the c...
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This article provides a framework for analyzing the effects of imperfect ownership unbundling and the effectiveness of related corporate governance mechanisms as well as regulatory actions to mitigate against such effects in the case of operators of an electricity transmission grid, i.e., so-called Transmission System Operators (TSOs). We propose a matrix analysis that considers three main tasks of a TSO (as one dimension) for different unbundling scenarios (as the other dimension). We apply the matrix for analyzing the case of the Swiss TSO Swissgrid as a special form of imperfect unbundling. Based on a task based welfare analysis, we argue that full ownership unbundling is optimal for certain strategic decisions such as the transfer of the grid from old to new owners. In some cases, corporate governance mechanisms, no matter how sophisticated, will not solve conflicts of interest within an imperfectly unbundled electricity firm. Also, in some cases, regulatory action cannot mitigate such imperfection. In contrast, we find no evidence that operations suffer from this lack in corporate governance. Insofar, trade-offs arise between different degrees of unbundling.
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The paper analyses the two alternative models of competition, which have been promoted by the Regulatory Authorities in fixed telecommunications. The facility-based competition requires the new entrants to build their own infrastr...
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The paper analyses the two alternative models of competition, which have been promoted by the Regulatory Authorities in fixed telecommunications. The facility-based competition requires the new entrants to build their own infrastructures, in order to be independent from the network of the incumbent, while in the service-based model, the new entrants provide their services using the incumbent's network. Both models have pros and cons and the regulators have tried to combine the advantages of both of them. However, enduring economic bottlenecks remain in fixed telecom networks, mainly in the local loop, where infrastructure-based competition is unlikely to emerge, due to the fundamental economics of building competing infrastructures. Therefore, the Regulatory Authorities have imposed the local loop unbundling (LLU) in order to speed up the development of broadband services. However, further steps may be necessary to ensure that LLU is really successful, allowing the development of competitive markets.
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摘要 :
Traditional restructuring of power markets has focused on legally separating monopolistic transmission and distribution infrastructure with sufficient regulatory oversight to ensure non-discriminatory access to networks, and trans...
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Traditional restructuring of power markets has focused on legally separating monopolistic transmission and distribution infrastructure with sufficient regulatory oversight to ensure non-discriminatory access to networks, and transparent and cost-reflective tariffs. There is consensus that ownership separation for transmission assets is beneficial for competition and transparency. However, at the distribution level the benefits of going beyond legal unbundling are questionable. This paper reviews the theoretical arguments for ownership unbundling and summarises the findings from 23 academic papers and consulting reports. In addition, this paper empirically demonstrates that forced distribution ownership unbundling in New Zealand (from 1998) and the Netherlands (from 2009) did not increase retail competition and did not increase network quality. It resulted in significant one-off and structural costs. The combination of increasingly active distribution networks with bi-directional power flows from distributed renewables, in combination with the digitalisation of energy supply and creation of distribution data platforms, suggests that interaction between networks and customers, traditionally separated from a regulatory and competition perspective may become more interlinked in future. Policymakers should therefore assess a broader set of policy measures, taking into account this changing network landscape, when focusing on increasing retail competition and network quality.
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The ‘old’ globalization was about things we
make
. The future globalization will be quite different: it will also be about things we
do
. This future is coming incredib
The ‘old’ globalization was about things we
make
. The future globalization will be quite different: it will also be about things we
do
. This future is coming incredibly fast and in ways few people expect. Digital technology is making it possible for ‘tele‐migrants’ sitting in one country to do things in another country, and for AI to become incredibly effective in certain kinds of tasks. We need to prepare ourselves for the future of globalization by building up skills that allow us to avoid direct competition with tele‐migrants and by realizing that humanity is an edge.
摘要 :
What effect does the firm structure have on the quality of service delivered by networks and infrastructure industries? We answer this question by empirically assessing the impacts of complete vertical separation, such as ownershi...
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What effect does the firm structure have on the quality of service delivered by networks and infrastructure industries? We answer this question by empirically assessing the impacts of complete vertical separation, such as ownership unbundling, on the quality of service delivered by a liberalized network industry. Electricity distribution utilities in New Zealand are considered for this purpose and are analysed using panel-data econometrics. The results show robust evidence that ownership unbundling contributed to a fall in the duration and frequency of supply interruptions in electricity distribution. However, the results also show that unbundling has no effect on reducing distribution network losses. These results, overall, highlight the nonsimple impacts of ownership unbundling on the quality of electricity distribution. We suggest that the quality of service may largely improve when considered in the economic regulation of electricity networks than completely relying on specific reform measures such as ownership unbundling.
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摘要 :
When the facilities of an incumbent monopolist are made available to potential competitors through some type of "essential facilities" or related claim, a concern is that the ability to "buy" inputs substantially attenuates the in...
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When the facilities of an incumbent monopolist are made available to potential competitors through some type of "essential facilities" or related claim, a concern is that the ability to "buy" inputs substantially attenuates the incentive to "make" inputs. We evaluate both theoretically and empirically the relationship between "make" and "buy" and find three sometimes-conflicting effects are present, of which the substitution effect is only one. Our empirical example considers the deployment of switching facilities by entrants to local exchange telecommunications markets, and these empirics indicate that the substitution effect is not dominant in this particular case.
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