摘要 :
Robotics represent the greatest unfulfilled technological promise of the latetwentieth century, and perhaps nowhere is this more true than in the area of military robotics. Closer examination of this issue suggests a compelling qu...
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Robotics represent the greatest unfulfilled technological promise of the latetwentieth century, and perhaps nowhere is this more true than in the area of military robotics. Closer examination of this issue suggests a compelling question. Is this failure due to technological immaturity or simply our collective inability (or unwillingness) to exploit technologic opportunity. The paper begins with an historical perspective, followed by an analysis of the technologies relevant to military robotics. The author then moves on to look at some representative unmanned systems, followed by a projection beyond the Army XXI period of interest into the more distant future.
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This report presents a method to quantify the effect of depot maintenance fundingon aircraft readiness and of forecasting maintenance budget requirements on that basis. It concludes that, while the Air Force should pursue improvem...
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This report presents a method to quantify the effect of depot maintenance fundingon aircraft readiness and of forecasting maintenance budget requirements on that basis. It concludes that, while the Air Force should pursue improvements in technical guarantee stability and accuracy of the forecast. Given the inherent volatility in item demand rates and forecasting methods, that course alone would not and procedures to provide visibility and management the effect of Air Force management decisions, the Air Force needs also to develop stronger tools control of the requirement.
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Two future-oriented publications of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Cent...
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Two future-oriented publications of the U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command,Pamphlet 525-5, Force XXI Operations: A Concept for the Evolution of Full-Dimensional Operations for the Strategic Army of the Early Twenty-First Century, and a draft FM 100-6, Information Operations, have alluded to adding information as a fifth element to Huba Wass de Czege's Relative Combat Model. Wass de Czege developed his model, comprising the elements of firepower, maneuver, survivability, and leadership as a means of analyzing the factors essential for tactical success. This monograph evaluates the propriety of adding information to Wass de Czege's model. Organized into six sections, this monograph first introduces the problem and identifies the significance of the issue. The second section traces the historical antecedents of combat power and information through the twentieth century. The third section analyzes the Wass de Czege's model and determines that information has been an integral component since the model's inception in 1976. The fourth section evaluates the role of information in battle in 2010 and determines that while the U.S. Army may place greater reliance on information than in the past, the anticipated uses of information are neither new nor revolutionary. The fifth section evaluates the relationship of information to the concept of combat power in 2010 and determines that the publications do not share the same perspective. This divergence is likely related to the disparate understanding of the term information. The last section synthesizes the findings from the previous sections and concludes the current combat power model adequately addresses information and should not be changed.
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The Task Force addressed four aspects of information architecture for thebattlefield: the use of information in warfare; the use of information warfare, both offensive and defensive; the business practices of the DoD in acquiring ...
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The Task Force addressed four aspects of information architecture for thebattlefield: the use of information in warfare; the use of information warfare, both offensive and defensive; the business practices of the DoD in acquiring and using battlefield information systems; and the underlying technology required to develop and implement these systems. This report emphasizes the importance of the warfighter as the principal customer for battlefield information systems. In today's complex world, the warfighter requires flexible information systems that can be readily and rapidly adapted to accomplish different missions. Further, the Task Force is quite concerned that DoD information systems are highly vulnerable to information warfare. However, the Task Force also found that the information systems of potential adversaries are also quite vulnerable. The Task Force believes that management structure changes can provide an effective approach to integration of disparate systems. The group reinforces that notion that DoD can greatly enhance the effectiveness of limited DoD resources by leveraging available commercial products and technology.
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The American 'way of war' emphasizes overwhelming force and advanced technology.Unfortunately, these factors may not be decisive in every type of conflict. Information and technology remain tools with limitations that are not full...
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The American 'way of war' emphasizes overwhelming force and advanced technology.Unfortunately, these factors may not be decisive in every type of conflict. Information and technology remain tools with limitations that are not fully recognized. Information systems are enhancing command and control as well as target acquisition. However, reliance on these tools limits the opportunity for operational innovation and obscures the use of planning tools. The center of gravity concept is limited by service perceptions and differing definitions. Common understanding of these tools of war would enhance their utility and help the United States fight better in the future.
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The purpose of this book is to outline the aerospace aspects of future war.Because future war is an exceptionally broad subject, three caveats are in order. (1) This book outlines only future state versus state warfare. Its theori...
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The purpose of this book is to outline the aerospace aspects of future war.Because future war is an exceptionally broad subject, three caveats are in order. (1) This book outlines only future state versus state warfare. Its theories are applicable only to future wars between sovereign states and alliances of sovereign states. States have organized militaries, infrastructures, production bases, capitals, and populations. These components enable unique capabilities and vulnerabilities-which dictate the scope and character of war. Because states alone have these attributes, theories of state versus state war are unique. The book is not intended to provide a template for wars with nonstates such as future versions of Somali clans, Bosnian Serbs, or Vietcong. Nonstate warfare is certainly important; its future deserves serious treatment. However, because nonstates differ fundamentally from states, an examination of future nonstate warfare requires a wholly separate treatment. Nonstates, by definition, exist without infrastructures, production bases, and capitals. Nonstates usually have neither organized militaries nor any responsibility for populations. In essence, nonstates have completely different makeups relative to states. Because of these gross differences, nonstates require their own theories of war. It is impossible to reconcile both state and nonstate conflict into one theory. Future aerospace operations in wars with nonstates must remain for others to address. This particular book views future aerospace operations through only one prism, that of state versus state conflict. (2) This book reviews only the aerospace aspects of future war. This limited focus is not meant to slight land and naval campaigns-they will remain crucial to future war, forming fundamental components of joint campaigns.
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The rapid growth in information technologies has generated three myths ofinformation warfare: omniscience, obsolescence of armed forces, and information itself as a new center of gravity. Unfortunately, this obscures the true role...
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The rapid growth in information technologies has generated three myths ofinformation warfare: omniscience, obsolescence of armed forces, and information itself as a new center of gravity. Unfortunately, this obscures the true role of information technologies in better integrating information at all levels of warfare as well as creating an enhanced capability in synthesizing information with the better placement of ordnance on target. Information thus serves as a force multiplier and is best seen as a critical strength or vulnerability dependent upon the ability to exploit any information differential that may exist between opposing forces. At the same time, information technologies have had a pronounced effect upon the operational commander by enhancing and limiting mission planning, necessitating more complex information filtering, and through altering the commander's ability to execute a mission in a decentralized manner.
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