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Will the implementation of the 'C4I for the Warrior concept justify theelimination of the operational commander from the military C2 process. No, technology enhancements that the 'C41 for the Warrior' concept is designed to provid...
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Will the implementation of the 'C4I for the Warrior concept justify theelimination of the operational commander from the military C2 process. No, technology enhancements that the 'C41 for the Warrior' concept is designed to provide do not justify the elimination of the operational level commander from the military C2 process structure. Although the 'C41 for the Warrior' technologies appear to effectively bridge the strategic and tactical levels of the military C2 process structure, the operational commander (in reality) performs vital operational level functions in the C2 process. Three C2 process structures are presented and used as a means of comparing how the implementation of new technologies may allow and/or require a change in the C2 process structure as we have known it. New technologies will likely enhance the operational commanders ability to perform the operational functions. However, the potential for strategic level overcentralization/micromanagement of the operational/tactical levels and a reliance on technology without due regard for the Information Warfare (IW) threat will pose significant challenges for the operational commander as the military C2 process structure evolves.
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This paper examines the location of the operational commander on the battlefield during the 20th century. It focuses on where he could be found during the fight, the techniques he used to develop and issue orders, and how he insur...
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This paper examines the location of the operational commander on the battlefield during the 20th century. It focuses on where he could be found during the fight, the techniques he used to develop and issue orders, and how he insured his subordinates understood and complied with his instructions. Then, it draws conclusions as to where the operational commander should be located on the high-intensity battlefield of the early 21st century. A comparative analysis of six World War II generals is conducted to determine their methods of command and control. The results of a study commissioned by the army are reviewed. Doctrine is discussed and warfare in the early 21st century is examined. Finally, recommendations with regard to the location and activities of the commander are discussed. The paper concludes with several points. First, the commander needs to command as far forward as practical. He should spend most of his time either with his subordinate commanders or at his Tactical Command Post. He should use a system of liaison officers to serve as his 'directed telescope.' Finally, he must make decisions based on his staff's recommendations, his own observations and analysis, and his sixth sense or his coup d'oeil. (jhd)
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The authors describe Version 4.0 of the EVEREST Initial Mesh Generator (Inimsh)211 which forms part of the EVEREST semiconductor device modelling suite of programs. 211 This module is responsible for producing the coarse initial m...
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The authors describe Version 4.0 of the EVEREST Initial Mesh Generator (Inimsh)211 which forms part of the EVEREST semiconductor device modelling suite of programs. 211 This module is responsible for producing the coarse initial mesh which can be 211 used as the starting point for automatic mesh refinement in the Solver module.
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Contents: Tactical air command and strategic air command flying hour programs; (Readiness/training requirements are subjective, flying levels, budget process not totally representative of unit training requirements, some pilots an...
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Contents: Tactical air command and strategic air command flying hour programs; (Readiness/training requirements are subjective, flying levels, budget process not totally representative of unit training requirements, some pilots and crewmembers exceed total flying requirements); Military readiness definitions and criteria under Joint Chiefs of Staff's Unit Status and Identity Report (UNITREP) system; Estimated SAC flying requirements; Distribution of TAC's annual flying hours for fiscal years 1980 through 1986; Pilot air refueling proficiency requirement to be mission ready; Comments from the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Force Management and Personnel.
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History provides many examples of tension between operational and tactical commanders. Not all of these conflicts can be dismissed as matters of personality or competency. An alternative explanation is that the distinct perspectiv...
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History provides many examples of tension between operational and tactical commanders. Not all of these conflicts can be dismissed as matters of personality or competency. An alternative explanation is that the distinct perspectives of those commanders so affected their views of a given operation or campaign that they were inevitably drawn into conflict over how to proceed. According to military theorist Shimon Naveh, this tension is natural. The tactical commander will inevitably focus on the achievement of his tactical objectives with less regard to the achievement of strategic objectives. Similarly, the operational commander will focus on the achievement of strategic objectives with less regard to the achievement of tactical objectives. This monograph explores this tension with respect to current U.S. Armed Forces doctrine. The monograph initially examines the writings of two theorists: Ludwig von Bertalanffy and Shimon Naveh in order to describe this cognitive tension that arises between the attainment of strategic and tactical objectives. This segment establishes the theoretical basis for the remainder of the monograph. The monograph then examines a historical example with the purpose of providing concrete examples of cognitive tension and practical examples of how a commander can resolve it. The monograph explores the operations conducted on Luzon in 1945 by Allied Forces, Southwest Pacific Area that resulted in the defeat of the Japanese 14th Area Army and its supporting forces. This examination focuses on the interaction between the American operational commander, General Douglas MacArthur, and the primary ground tactical commander, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, with respect to cognitive tension. The final section of the monograph evaluates the effectiveness of Joint Publication 30 Doctrine for Joint Operations in regards to cognitive tension and provides recommendations for its revision.
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CENTCOM is one of six geographic combatant commands that DOD operates to perform its military missions. CENTCOM s geographic region is composed of countries located in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central and South Asia. CEN...
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CENTCOM is one of six geographic combatant commands that DOD operates to perform its military missions. CENTCOM s geographic region is composed of countries located in the Middle East, North Africa, and Central and South Asia. CENTCOM and each of its service component commands headquarters are composed of military and civilian personnel and receive millions of dollars in funding each year to accomplish assigned missions. GAO was mandated to review CENTCOM s resources. This report (1) identifies trends in personnel devoted to CENTCOM and its service component commands since fiscal year 2001 and any steps DOD is planning to take for reducing personnel in the future, and (2) assesses how DOD funds CENTCOM and its service component commands headquarters costs. GAO analyzed data on authorized positions, temporary personnel, and headquarters costs for CENTCOM and its service component commands from fiscal years 2001 through 2013. GAO also interviewed DOD officials about commands resources and plans for funding headquarters costs.
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The character of cyberspace, the requirement to share situational awareness, and a need for coordination of cyber effects crossing geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) has driven continued centralization of cyberspace command...
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The character of cyberspace, the requirement to share situational awareness, and a need for coordination of cyber effects crossing geographic areas of responsibility (AORs) has driven continued centralization of cyberspace command and control (C2). This centralization confronts traditional command relationships and will likely generate friction between the future Commander, U.S. Cyber Command (CDR USCYBERCOM) and Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs). Easing of friction requires a careful balance of equities between these Joint Force Commanders (JFCs) and must provide for global unity of effort while not significantly constraining the GCC's freedom of action in the cyber domain. To achieve this balance, the Department of Defense (DOD) should specify establishment, exercise and institutionalization of a Cyber Coordination Authority (CCA). CCA will define, through DOD establishing directives, detailed authorities used by supported and supporting combatant commanders to adequately plan, prepare, and control reach back cyber capabilities organic to USCYBERCOM. To exercise CCA on behalf of the GCC, a Director of Cyber Forces (DIRCYBERFOR) is required to advise, coordinate, integrate and perform staffing functions to weave robust cyber effects throughout the GCC's major lines of operations. CCA requires institutionalization within joint and service doctrines to legitimize cyberspace as a warfighting domain, formalize cyberspace operations, and provide an effective forum to advocate for resources.
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This study particularly takes up two notions, among others, within the range of application in a NCWINBD environment, intent and the ideal command concept according to Builder et al. (1999). The purpose of this pilot study is to o...
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This study particularly takes up two notions, among others, within the range of application in a NCWINBD environment, intent and the ideal command concept according to Builder et al. (1999). The purpose of this pilot study is to observe how Canadian and Swedish commanders reason when it comes to aspects influencing intent and command concepts. Empirical data was gathered through interview and interview questionnaires with eleven Canadian and eleven Swedish senior officers. Both Canadian and Swedish commanders stressed that the communication and dissemination of intent or operationally relevant information are highly context dependent. When it comes to communicating and disseminating intent there were few differences and many commonalities between Canadian and Swedish commanders. A majority of the interviewed commanders from both nations underlined that the factors in the ideal command concept by Builder et al. is nothing new except for the template and the structure. A majority of the interviewees lacked end-states and acceptable risks in the template. Commanders from both nations have stressed the importance of communicating intent and orders in person and face to face to subordinates in order to support them.
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