摘要: History provides many examples of tension between operational and tactical commanders. Not all of these conflicts can be dismissed as matters of personality or competency. An alternative explanation is that the distinct perspectiv... 展开 History provides many examples of tension between operational and tactical commanders. Not all of these conflicts can be dismissed as matters of personality or competency. An alternative explanation is that the distinct perspectives of those commanders so affected their views of a given operation or campaign that they were inevitably drawn into conflict over how to proceed. According to military theorist Shimon Naveh, this tension is natural. The tactical commander will inevitably focus on the achievement of his tactical objectives with less regard to the achievement of strategic objectives. Similarly, the operational commander will focus on the achievement of strategic objectives with less regard to the achievement of tactical objectives. This monograph explores this tension with respect to current U.S. Armed Forces doctrine. The monograph initially examines the writings of two theorists: Ludwig von Bertalanffy and Shimon Naveh in order to describe this cognitive tension that arises between the attainment of strategic and tactical objectives. This segment establishes the theoretical basis for the remainder of the monograph. The monograph then examines a historical example with the purpose of providing concrete examples of cognitive tension and practical examples of how a commander can resolve it. The monograph explores the operations conducted on Luzon in 1945 by Allied Forces, Southwest Pacific Area that resulted in the defeat of the Japanese 14th Area Army and its supporting forces. This examination focuses on the interaction between the American operational commander, General Douglas MacArthur, and the primary ground tactical commander, Lieutenant General Walter Krueger, with respect to cognitive tension. The final section of the monograph evaluates the effectiveness of Joint Publication 30 Doctrine for Joint Operations in regards to cognitive tension and provides recommendations for its revision. 收起