摘要 : Although many have proposed theories explaining trade promotion (TP) behaviour by manufacturers, lack of data has prevented empirical assessment. We employ survey data to explore the effect of manufacturer and retailer bargaining ... 展开 Although many have proposed theories explaining trade promotion (TP) behaviour by manufacturers, lack of data has prevented empirical assessment. We employ survey data to explore the effect of manufacturer and retailer bargaining power on the allocation of TPs in the U.S. food sector. The survey respondents consist of retailers controlling 40% of retail sales in U.S. supermarkets. The data consists of 216 observations at the brand level (36 supermarket companies, times 2 product categories, times 3 brands), of which 185 are usable for analysis. Retailer bargaining power increases the allocation of funds to off-invoice TPs through higher share of private label and retailer size. Manufacturer bargaining power decreases the allocation of funds to off-invoice TPs by establishing formal policies of negotiation.. 收起