摘要 : This paper discusses how slotting allowances paid by food manufacturers and producers to supermarket retailers can serve to increase the provision of retail product variety, besides facilitating higher retail prices. In settings w... 展开 This paper discusses how slotting allowances paid by food manufacturers and producers to supermarket retailers can serve to increase the provision of retail product variety, besides facilitating higher retail prices. In settings with elastic demand, slotting allowances can have competing welfare effects. By raising prices, slotting fees reduce welfare. By raising variety, these fees can raise welfare. However, the numerical work presented in this paper illustrates how, when demand is sufficiently elastic, slotting contracts can lead to such an excessive abundance of products that the variety effects of the contracts are also welfare-depleting. While unambiguous statements on the merits of slotting contracts are hard to make, this work suggests that product variety is an important margin to consider when evaluating this retail practice.Digital Object Identifier http://dx.doi.org/10.1093/ajae/aat023 收起