摘要: The fundamental assumptions the U.S. Army makes between the most likely (small-scale contingency stability and support operations) and most dangerous (high intensity/major theater war) contingencies drive all subsequent decisions ... 展开 The fundamental assumptions the U.S. Army makes between the most likely (small-scale contingency stability and support operations) and most dangerous (high intensity/major theater war) contingencies drive all subsequent decisions over apportioning limited resources, force structure, training and equipment in an organization where division and corps commanders serve two masters. The two masters are manifested in the dilemma of resourcing and doctrine to support the divergence of requirements to operate as organic division and corps headquarters conducting traditional missions in a major theater war (MTW) or operate as an Army Forces (ARFOR), Joint Force Land Component Command (JFLCC) or Joint Task Force (JTF) conducting small- scale contingency operations. An examination of National Command Authority (NCA) guidance, recent U.S. military operations, contingency plans for the warfighting CinCs and Army and joint doctrine shows that Army divisions and corps are expected to operate as joint headquarters. Without examining the question of whether these divisions and corps are organized and equipped to operate at that level, this monograph offers an answer to the research question; does the current training model for divisions and corps support employment as an ARFOR, JFLCC or JTF. The answer is no. The wartime focus of Army training doctrine, lack of authoritative joint doctrine for peacetime training as well as the lack of doctrine at the operational level for the JFLCC represent significant gaps in providing the direction necessary to ensure success when operating as a headquarters within this very complex environment. When coupled with the changing strategic environment outlined in the National Security Strategy (NSS) and National Military Strategy (NMS) and the expectation for divisions and corps from contingency plans and recent operations, it is the assertion of this author, that these headquarters are not given the tools to train in the division. 收起