摘要:
FM 25-100 Training the Force, 1988, with its 'how to' manual, FM 25- 101 Battle Focused Training, 1990, have proven successful in preparing the Army for conventional warfare as demonstrated by the Army's superior performance durin...
展开
FM 25-100 Training the Force, 1988, with its 'how to' manual, FM 25- 101 Battle Focused Training, 1990, have proven successful in preparing the Army for conventional warfare as demonstrated by the Army's superior performance during Operation DESERT STORM in 1991. Since then, the Army reduced size and changed structure, while the number of missions increased. Presidential Review Directive (PRD) 13 (1993) and Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 (1994) broadened the Army's scope of responsibilities and involved the nation in an ever-increasing range of Stability and Support Operations (SASO). Though the Army is heavily committed to SASOs, current training doctrine does not address training management for SASO missions. National Security Strategy requires the US Army to be prepared to rapidly deploy to two near-simultaneous conventional wars along with a variety of smaller stability and support operations. Since the end of the Cold War, ethnic and religious nationalism has generated increased conflicts and human suffering worldwide. US interests abroad, with active participation in the United Nations and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, have resulted in increased deployments and participation by the US Army in SASO missions. Since the end of the Cold War, the Army has been reduced to ten Active Component divisions while the number of deployments has increased. FM 25-100 and 101 provide a systemic formula designed to sustain unit training and readiness for conventional warfighting. Using this doctrine, units identify their most essential 'go to war' tasks and design training programs that train and sustain these tasks. Known as the 'band of excellence', divisions are either training or executing combat-oriented tasks in support of National Security Policy requirements. SASO missions conflict with training doctrine. Some SASOs sustain warfighting tasks; Bosnia SASOs do not. Divisions deploying to Bosnia cannot sustain Major Theater War tasks a.
收起
