摘要 : Fisheries management often fails because total allowable catches (TACs) are set at inefficiently high levels. To study why decision-makers choose such high TACs, we model the annual negotiation on TACs as a dynamic game in discret... 展开
作者 | Hoffmann~ Julia Quaas~ Martin F. |
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作者单位 | |
期刊名称 | 《Environmental & Resource Economics》 |
页码/总页数 | 79-93 / 15 |
语种/中图分类号 | 英语 / F |
关键词 | Fisheries Fishery economics Environmental uncertainty Constant escapement Political economy Dynamic game theory |
DOI | 10.1007/s10640-014-9842-4 |
馆藏号 | F-034 |