摘要: Today's Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander is the single uniformed military service commander most likely to be concerned with prosecuting joint military operations during the decade of the nineties. His ability to successfully comm... 展开 Today's Joint Task Force (JTF) Commander is the single uniformed military service commander most likely to be concerned with prosecuting joint military operations during the decade of the nineties. His ability to successfully command and control assigned forces will certainly be a key factor in determining the outcome of any such future operations. What are the JTF commanders' command, control, and communications (C3) capabilities. Is today's JTF commander better able to command and control his force than those who executed joint operations since the end of the Vietnam war. Have previously identified C3 problems been fixed and if not, why not. Will his C3 capabilities be adequate. The purpose of this monograph is to answer these questions. The paper begins with a few basic definitions to lay the groundwork for the discussion of joint C3 that follows. It continues with a comparative analysis of C3 at the operational level of war using four joint combat operations conducted by U.S. military forces since the end of Vietnam. These operations are: 1) The 1975 Mayaguez Incident, 2) The 1980 Iranian Hostage Rescue Attempt, 3) The 1983 Grenada Invasion, and 4) The 1986 Libya Raid. Evidence is presented from periodicals, books, theses, government reports and JCS manuals. Finally, a review of applicable emerging JTF C3 doctrine is conducted. (kr) 收起