摘要: This study attempted to determine a command and control pattern of the NCA to the tactical commander during direct and rapid military intervention due to a crisis. A case study was made of five crises: Congo-1964, Son Tay Raid-197... 展开 This study attempted to determine a command and control pattern of the NCA to the tactical commander during direct and rapid military intervention due to a crisis. A case study was made of five crises: Congo-1964, Son Tay Raid-1970, Mayaguez Incident-1975, Operation Paul Bunyan-1976 (Korean tree cutting incident) and the Iran Raid-1980. A comparison of the preferred solution developed from the predetermined apparatus (operational implementation) and the actual command and control of men and organizations of men (cybernetics) of each case developed a cybernetic pattern. The NCA perceives it has omniscient cybernetics enabling it to effectively and efficiently control operations of any U.S. military force anywhere in the world. Omniscient cybernetics is a defective myth. During a direct and rapid military intervention in response to a crisis the increased involvement of the higher levels of command in tactical planning and execution severely lowered the chances of success of the operation. Conversely, the closer the similarity between the system, operational implementation, and the process, cybernetics, the greater chances of success. Three paramount ingredients narrow the gap and enhance success: the principle of unity of command, the principle of simplicity and coup d'oeil. (Author) 收起