摘要 : Sengupta and Sengupta (Int Econ Rev 35:347-359, 1994) consider a payoff configuration of a TU game as a viable proposal if it challenges each legitimate contender. Lauwers (Int Econ Rev 43:1369-1371, 2002) prove that the set of vi... 展开
作者 | Yang~ Yi-You |
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作者单位 | |
期刊名称 | 《Theory and Decision》 |
页码/总页数 | 453-469 / 17 |
语种/中图分类号 | 英语 / C0 |
关键词 | Viable proposal Undominated proposal Accessible proposal Coalition structure core Minimal dominant set |
DOI | 10.1007/s11238-020-09762-4 |
馆藏号 | C-009 |