摘要 :
This monograph specifically examines the history, current doctrine, and emerging concepts on how Close Air Support (CAS) is defined, employed, and controlled to determine if CAS will be where it's needed and when to facilitate eff...
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This monograph specifically examines the history, current doctrine, and emerging concepts on how Close Air Support (CAS) is defined, employed, and controlled to determine if CAS will be where it's needed and when to facilitate effective Objective Force operations in 2015. The answer to this question is no unless the definition, doctrine, and integration of CAS with the ground component scheme of maneuver is improved.
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摘要 :
The joint close air support (JCAS) community is struggling to determine future close air support (CAS) employment tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Since 1996, the JCAS community, lead by an Office of the Secretary of De...
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The joint close air support (JCAS) community is struggling to determine future close air support (CAS) employment tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTPs). Since 1996, the JCAS community, lead by an Office of the Secretary of Defense JCAS Joint Test Force, has tried to improve JCAS by proposing changes in training, doctrine, equipment and organization. Differing service perspectives and the advent of new technologies make agreement on necessary doctrinal changes tenuous. The primary question set out in this thesis asks, Are the changes in terminal attack control framework proposed in the draft JP 3-09.3 necessary and sufficient for current and near future operations. The paper examines contentious issues such as battlefield air interdiction (BAI), the fire support coordination line (FSCL), CAS definitions, and the purpose of maintaining separate categories of control. It then structures a qualitative comparative analysis of the current and proposed terminal attack control procedural frameworks based upon the criteria of simplicity, completeness, and utility. The evidence of this study suggests that proposed doctrinal changes are necessary, but the overall utility of the draft terminal attack control framework is not sufficient. This study makes five recommendations for improvements in JCAS doctrine.
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During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division Artillery continued its participation in Operation MACARTHUR. For a portion of the period, 1 February - 30 March, the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was attached to ...
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During the period covered by this report, the 4th Infantry Division Artillery continued its participation in Operation MACARTHUR. For a portion of the period, 1 February - 30 March, the 2d Battalion, 9th Artillery was attached to the 3d Brigade, 4th Infantry Division which was under Operational Control of the Americal Division where it participated in Operation WHEELER/WALLOWA and Operation PATRICK.
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In May 2011, International Security Assistance Force Commander General David Petraeus said the responsiveness of close air support (CAS) in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) went from great to exceptional in the previous year. He f...
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In May 2011, International Security Assistance Force Commander General David Petraeus said the responsiveness of close air support (CAS) in Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF) went from great to exceptional in the previous year. He further stated, The traditional standard had been 12 minutes from the time assets are requested to when they are on station. Recently the average response time has fluctuated around eight minutes. This reduction applied specifically to troops in contact (TIC) situations where ground forces request CAS. Ground forces request CAS when their organic assets cannot handle the situation. In practical terms, this means aircraft are normally responding where ground forces are receiving accurate fire. Four minutes can seem like an eternity to a soldier in the middle of a complex ambush. Aircraft arriving even a few seconds earlier can make the difference between life and death. Numerous agencies and people contributed to this success story, but a great deal of credit belongs to three U.S. Air Force (USAF) captains and a Royal Air Force flight lieutenant2 at the Air Support Operations Center (ASOC) in Kabul. Their leadership as Fighter Duty Officers (FDOs) in charge of their respective shifts in the ASOC directly resulted in the increased responsiveness that General Petraeus lauded. They motivated their crews of highly skilled Airmen to reduce the historically acceptable 12-minute response time to TIC situations. Command and control of airpower in a complex combat environment is not easy, yet they saw the potential for improved support to the coalition s fielded forces and fought to provide it. As the campaign in Afghanistan enters its drawdown phase, an examination of how they achieved this dramatic decrease is appropriate.
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摘要 :
This study examines whether current and future strategy, doctrine, and programmed systems are suitable to perform fire support and specifically, close air support (CAS) and close air support/troops-in-contact (CAS/TIC) missions fo...
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This study examines whether current and future strategy, doctrine, and programmed systems are suitable to perform fire support and specifically, close air support (CAS) and close air support/troops-in-contact (CAS/TIC) missions for joint expeditionary warfare. Naval forces will provide the enabling' power for this new come-as-you-are environment. To offset reductions in organic fire support, more frequent and sustained application of CAS and CAS/TIC will be required by joint expeditionary forces. To comparatively analyze selected CAS platforms, the study uses four air-to-ground measures of merit (MOM): (1) target detection/recognition; (2) lethality; (3) survivability; and (4) combat persistence. The results paint a bleak picture of current capability. Therefore, a Carrier-Based Gunship (CBG) concept is presented to fill this void. The concept is more important than the selection of one particular platform. For illustrative purposes, three CBG candidates were evaluated using AC- 130 gunship systems and employment as a guide coupled with the four MOM as the baseline. The CBG would be situated on a forward-deployed carrier, close enough to the objective area to provide sustained CAS/TIC support for joint expeditionary forces.
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摘要 :
Partial contents: Civil Sector Dominance, Changing Military Role, Why Do Research, Defence Technology Strategy, Prediction isn't easy and is rarely accurate, General Themes, Close Combat & Combat Support, General Munitions and Energetics Technologies, Complex Weapons, C4ISTAR, CBRN, Counter Terrorism, Cross-Cutting Technologies, The Human as Part of the System,Emerging Technologies, Competition of Ideas,University Research Schemes, Grand Challenge, DTS and Collaboration,Information Exploitation, The Armour Technical Working Group, Third Generation Focal Plane Arrays for IR Sensors....
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Partial contents: Civil Sector Dominance, Changing Military Role, Why Do Research, Defence Technology Strategy, Prediction isn't easy and is rarely accurate, General Themes, Close Combat & Combat Support, General Munitions and Energetics Technologies, Complex Weapons, C4ISTAR, CBRN, Counter Terrorism, Cross-Cutting Technologies, The Human as Part of the System,Emerging Technologies, Competition of Ideas,University Research Schemes, Grand Challenge, DTS and Collaboration,Information Exploitation, The Armour Technical Working Group, Third Generation Focal Plane Arrays for IR Sensors.
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