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This article addresses the effects of damage to equipment and structures due to explosions (blast), fire, and heat as well as the methodologies that are used by investigating teams to assess the damage and remaining life of the eq...
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This article addresses the effects of damage to equipment and structures due to explosions (blast), fire, and heat as well as the methodologies that are used by investigating teams to assess the damage and remaining life of the equipment. It discusses the steps involved in preliminary data collection and preparation. Before discussing the identification, evaluation, and use of explosion damage indicators, the article describes some of the more common events that are considered in incident investigations. The range of scenarios that can occur during explosions and the characteristics of each are also covered. In addition, the article primarily discusses level 1 and level 2 of fire and heat damage assessment and provides information on level 3 assessment.
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Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc. (BakerRisk?) has performed vented deflagration testing of congested enclosures over a range of configurations, congestion levels, and fuels. This paper provides a comparison of the meas...
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Baker Engineering and Risk Consultants, Inc. (BakerRisk?) has performed vented deflagration testing of congested enclosures over a range of configurations, congestion levels, and fuels. This paper provides a comparison of the measured flame jetting distances to predictions made applying standard methods commonly used to calculate the associated hazard zone. These methods include the National Fire Protection Association Standard on Explosion Protection by Deflagration Venting (NFPA 68 (National Fire Protection Association, 2018, )), the British Standard's Gas Explosion Venting Protective Systems (EN 14994 (British Standard EN 14994, 2007)), and a computational fluid dynamics (CFD) analysis. Nine test series were carried out using BakerRisk's Deflagration Load Generator (DLG) test rig. The DLG is a rectangular steel enclosure measuring 48-feet wide × 24-feet deep × 12-feet tall, yielding a total volume of 13,800 ft3 (391 m3), and is enclosed by three solid steel walls, a roof, and floor. The rig vents through one of the long walls (i.e., 48-foot × 12-foot). The venting face was sealed with a 6-mil (0.15 mm) thick plastic vapor barrier for these tests to allow for the formation of the desired fuel air-mixture throughout the rig. Both slightly hyper-stoichiometric propane and lean hydrogen mixtures have been tested in the DLG. Congestion was provided by an array of vertical cylinders. A range of congestion levels and fill fractions were tested. DLG testing was performed with and without vent panels present. Flame jetting distances from the venting face of the DLG were measured using high-speed video. Flame jetting distances were predicted using the Fireball Dimensions calculation from NFPA 68 and the Flame Effects calculation from EN 14994. Blind (i.e., pre-test) simulations were also performed using the FLACS CFD code (Gexcon, 2014). The flame jetting distance in the CFD simulation was determined as the horizontal distance from the DLG vent to the location where the gas temperature dropped below a specified value; the predicted distance for the fuel concentration to drop below half the lower flammability limit (LFL) was also evaluated to assess jetting distance.
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Catastrophic or major incidents are typically investigated immediately, but what about the near misses or minor failures that might be precursors to major incidents? Are they investigated? Major failures often do not occur as one ...
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Catastrophic or major incidents are typically investigated immediately, but what about the near misses or minor failures that might be precursors to major incidents? Are they investigated? Major failures often do not occur as one isolated issue or event; there are often less severe precursors to a major event. This paper presents a best practice and reasons for reviewing minor equipment failures in order to avoid major events as demonstrated through the judicious analysis of minor failures. Several case histories and the lessons learned from these minor equipment failure investigations are presented to encourage investigation of what may initially appear as insignificant failures, for their value in prevention of major incidents.
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The release of toxic ammonia can pose significant risk to personnel at facilities that handle the material.This risk can be mitigated through the construction and operation of highly effective toxic shelters.An accidental release ...
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The release of toxic ammonia can pose significant risk to personnel at facilities that handle the material.This risk can be mitigated through the construction and operation of highly effective toxic shelters.An accidental release of anhydrous ammonia can occur at any facility that handles ammonia.The risks associated with an accidental release of ammonia need to be managed to protect personnel,which is typically accomplished through sheltering in place and/or evacuation.This article discusses proper toxic shelter design,which must include reliable gas detection,ventilation isolation,and leak-tight boundaries.Other hazards,such as blast and thermal hazards,should also be considered when designing toxic shelters.Personnel should be trained for release scenarios,and an effective fallback plan should be established.Most importantly,a hazard-resistant shelter must be fully functional for its intended use and provide protection to personnel from the applicable process hazards.An example included in this article demonstrates a highly effective toxic-shelter design and examines a prolonged,severe toxic impact scenario.Calculation results are provided that show the toxic impacts to various parts of the building,including an interior room where occupants would shelter for added protection.
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The objective of this article is to provide lessons learned from materials, structure, and equipment failures so that costly failures can be prevented through good design, maintenance, and inspection practices, thus increasing saf...
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The objective of this article is to provide lessons learned from materials, structure, and equipment failures so that costly failures can be prevented through good design, maintenance, and inspection practices, thus increasing safety, equipment reliability, and integrity of designs.
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Facility siting mitigation decisions should be made in a logical and defensible manner. This article provides a framework for making and justifying facility siting mitigation decisions beginning with presenting risk results in a c...
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Facility siting mitigation decisions should be made in a logical and defensible manner. This article provides a framework for making and justifying facility siting mitigation decisions beginning with presenting risk results in a clear manner prior to identifying practical risk mitigation strategies, highlighting potential source and location risk mitigation strategies, demonstrating how these strategies can be evaluated with examples, and ultimately to quantifying and optimizing the safety-benefit of each mitigation strategy/combination of strategies. The outcome of this process provides a defensible basis for prioritization and practicality of risk mitigation strategies, or a combination of strategies that reduce facility risk to broadly acceptable levels or as low as reasonably practicable while minimizing expense.
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Facilities that handle hazardous materials above threshold quantities are required to assess the impacts due to postulated accidents involving releases of these materials, and to ensure that people are adequately protected from th...
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Facilities that handle hazardous materials above threshold quantities are required to assess the impacts due to postulated accidents involving releases of these materials, and to ensure that people are adequately protected from the associated fire, explosion, and toxic hazards. An analysis of these hazards can be based solely on consequences from maximum credible events or can incorporate the likelihood of the events to characterize results in terms of risk. The methods of performing these analyses may vary, but, regardless of the specific techniques used, fundamental principles of thoroughness and defensibility should be achieved. This study describes best practices and basic requirements for consequence-based and risk-based facility siting studies (FSSs), also commonly referred to as quantitative risk analyses, consistent with industry guidance. The fundamental objective of a consequence-based or risk-based FSS is to ensure that the consequences or risks posed by facility operations are minimized to the extent practical.
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The fertilizer industry is a critical sector that plays a significant role in supporting agricultural production and food security worldwide. However, the production and handling of fertilizers can expose workers and nearby commun...
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The fertilizer industry is a critical sector that plays a significant role in supporting agricultural production and food security worldwide. However, the production and handling of fertilizers can expose workers and nearby communities to hazardous chemicals and toxic gases. Therefore, it is crucial to implement appropriate safety measures, including the installation of reliable toxic gas detection systems, to ensure the prompt detection and mitigation of toxic gas releases in fertilizer plants. This article focuses on toxic gas detection in fertilizer plants as an essential tool for shelter-in-place (SIP) emergency responses to protect workers from toxic hazards.
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Facility siting methods to optimize the layout of industrial facilities for risk reduction have been evolving for decades from subjective views, standards, and guidelines to quantitative numerical analysis. The authors of this pap...
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Facility siting methods to optimize the layout of industrial facilities for risk reduction have been evolving for decades from subjective views, standards, and guidelines to quantitative numerical analysis. The authors of this paper have tossed out the past, moved beyond the present, and taken out their crystal balls to provide a discussion around the future of facility siting by focusing on technology driven enhancements associated with three main themes: mainstreaming of current advanced analysis techniques into the base case methodology, incorporating company and/or site specific data trending and analytics to operationalize the studies, and the potential transformational change to machine learning-based predictive risk management. With technological advancements touching nearly every area of business, it is no surprise that it is also changing the landscape of consequence and risk-based facility siting approaches. As with all markets, the customer will be a key driver for the advancements of technical safety studies to suit their adapting needs. However, as this article will show, personnel conducting facility siting studies are also using technological advancements to challenge the status quo by improving data fidelity, increasing the robustness and depth of analysis, and providing improved insights to aid decision making.
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Brittle fractures of pressure vessels can be both catastrophic and costly. The intent of this article is to provide guidance in avoiding such failures by identifying some of the causes for cold embrittlement hazards and brittle fr...
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Brittle fractures of pressure vessels can be both catastrophic and costly. The intent of this article is to provide guidance in avoiding such failures by identifying some of the causes for cold embrittlement hazards and brittle fracture in pressure vessels. Selected examples will help illustrate the main factors that contribute to brittle fracture, through identifying brittle fracture features, and demonstrating the importance of coordination of materials and potential operating condition. This article also discusses how to assess existing equipment pressure vessels subject to cold conditions and brittle fracture concerns using the guidelines of API 579-1/ASME FFS-1, Part 3.
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