摘要 : This paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies—contrary to existing practices. Instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform, ... 展开 This paper studies a simple reform that introduces ex post incentives for the donor to reward good policies—contrary to existing practices. Instead of committing aid to each recipient ex ante and making aid conditional on reform, the donor centralizes the disbursement decision by committing aid to a group of countries. The actual amount disbursed to each individual country would depend on its relative performance. This explicit linkage of the allocation and disbursement decisions has two importantadvantages as compared to present practices. First, it raises the opportunity cost of disbursing aid ex post, thereby giving the donor stronger incentives to reward good policies. Second, competition among recipients allows the donor to make inferences about common shocks, which otherwise conceal the recipient's choice of action. This enables the donor to give aid more efficiently. 收起