摘要: In the years leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States lacked a comprehensive national policy and strategy for aviation security. The approach to aviation security was largely shaped by past even... 展开 In the years leading up to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States lacked a comprehensive national policy and strategy for aviation security. The approach to aviation security was largely shaped by past events, such as the bombing of Pan Am flight 103 in December 1988, rather than a comprehensive evaluation of the full range of security risks. The 9/11 Commission concluded that the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001 revealed failures of imagination, policy, capabilities, and management by both the FAA and the U.S. intelligence community. Following the September 11, 2001 attacks, U.S. aviation security policy and strategy was closely linked to the changes called for in the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA, P.L. 107-71), which emphasized sweeping changes to the security of passenger airline operations. While the importance of strategic planning was recognized, it was not a priority. The 9/11 Commission Report concluded that the TSA had failed to develop an integrated strategy for the transportation sector and mode specific plans, prompting Congress to mandate the development of these strategies and plans in the Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 (P.L. 108- 458). While the TSA has developed these strategies and plans, the documents have been considered security sensitive thus limiting public discourse on the DHS strategy for aviation security. However, in June 2006 President Bush directed the DHS to establish and implement a national strategy for aviation security and an accompanying set of supporting plans. 收起