摘要: This paper initially constructs a model between coal mine safety regulation and the responding behavior of workers and business. Through the model, it analyzes the trade-offs between safety-and market-oriented products, and reveal... 展开 This paper initially constructs a model between coal mine safety regulation and the responding behavior of workers and business. Through the model, it analyzes the trade-offs between safety-and market-oriented products, and reveals the inhibitory effect of safety regulation on production efficiency of the industry. It puts forward and gives the definitions of "dominant moral hazard" and "partial moral hazard" respectively. On this basis, the paper conducts an empirical study of the effects of China's coal mine safety regulation on workers and business behavior. The results show that China's coal mine safety regulation actually reduces the efficiency of coal production, consistent with the theoretical reasoning and proposition that there exist obvious "partial moral hazard" problems in coal mine safety regulation, which should arouse the attention of the parties concerned.Finally, it makes concluding remarks and puts forward some points for further exploration. 收起