摘要: On one hand, major shareholders can use the excessive control right to expropriate interests from other small shareholders and managers, transfer assets of listed companies to meet their own interests and reduce the value of compa... 展开 On one hand, major shareholders can use the excessive control right to expropriate interests from other small shareholders and managers, transfer assets of listed companies to meet their own interests and reduce the value of companies, which is expressed as "entrenchment effect"; On the other hand, the legal environment in China is imperfect and lacks effective monitor system to protect the interests of shareholders. Major shareholders can use their control to monitor managers effectively, so it will reduce the agency costs and increase the value of companies, which is "alignment effect". In this paper, we use no-parameter model and fixed effect model to estimate the relationship between the above effects and the percentage of the largest shareholders, and find that with the increase of the largest shareholders' shares, the performance of Chinese listed companies shows an N-type curve, representing "alignment effect"-"entrenchment effect"-"alignment effect" by turns. The attributes of the largest shareholders are also connected with the two effects, and the state-owned shareholders are easier to display the behaviors of "the entrenchment effect", inducing that the performance is lower than the individual shares, and legal institute shares and foreign shares are not significantly connected with the performance; the introduction of other shareholders can effectively limit the largest shareholders and improve the performance of companies. 收起