摘要 : We document a more favorable market reaction to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by dividend-paying acquirers when compared to non-paying acquirers. Dividend-paying acquirers are associated with greater improvem... 展开 We document a more favorable market reaction to the announcement of mergers and acquisitions (M&As) by dividend-paying acquirers when compared to non-paying acquirers. Dividend-paying acquirers are associated with greater improvements in return on assets post-M&A. Furthermore, dividend-paying acquirers hold higher levels of cash and are more likely to engage in cash financed deals. We infer that an existing dividend payment policy acts as a disciplinary mechanism forcing managers to engage in value adding M&As, restricting self-motivated empire-building acquisitions. In order to preserve their ability to maintain dividends, dividend paying acquirers seek targets that can contribute to free cash flow. (C) 2020 Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois. Published by Elsevier Inc. All rights reserved. 收起