摘要 : As corporate managers interact with non-shareholder stakeholders, potential tradeoffs emerge and questions arise as to how these interactions impact shareholder value. We argue that this shareholder-stakeholder debate is an import... 展开 As corporate managers interact with non-shareholder stakeholders, potential tradeoffs emerge and questions arise as to how these interactions impact shareholder value. We argue that this shareholder-stakeholder debate is an important issue within the overall corporate governance and corporate policy domain and examine one such stakeholder group - employees - by studying labor-friendly corporate practices. We find that announcements of labor-friendly policies are associated with positive abnormal stock returns. Labor-friendly firms also outperform otherwise similar firms, both in terms of long-run stock market returns and operating results. In addition, we find that the probability and benefits of labor-friendliness increase with the demand for highly skilled labor. Our analysis of excess executive compensation suggests that top management derives no pecuniary benefits from labor-friendly practices. We interpret our results as consistent with a genuine concern for employees translating into higher productivity and profitability, which in turn facilitate value creation. It appears that the benefits ot labor-friendly practices significantly outweigh the costs and that what is good for employees is good for shareholders. 收起